Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
Lars Ehlers, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra, Arunava Sen
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Ehlers, Lars H. ; Majumdar, Dipjyoti ; Mishra, Debasis ; Sen, Arunava |
| Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 88.2020, p. 31-41
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| Subject: | Cardinal mechanism design | Incentive compatibility | Ordinal mechanism design | Strategic voting | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Anreiz | Incentives | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Nutzen | Utility |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012589924