Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels

by Jörg Oechssler

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	February 2001
Authors:	Oechssler, Joerg
Publisher:	Bonn : Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn
Subject:	cooperation \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Lernpsychologie \| Learning psychology \| Gefangenendilemma \| Prisoner's dilemma \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Erscheint auch als (Druck-Ausgabe):

Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels. - Bonn : Bonn Graduate School of Economics, 2001. - 5 Bl

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539809