Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers : computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Bichler, Martin ; Waldherr, Stefan |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Linthicum, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5463, ZDB-ID 2019440-7. - Vol. 70.2022, 1, p. 241-264
|
Subject: | Revenue Management and Market Analytics | bilevel programming | combinatorial exchange | multi-object auctions | payment rules | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Revenue-Management | Revenue management | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Auktion | Auction |
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