Corporate ownership as a means to solve adverse selection problems in a model of asymmettric information and credit rationing

S. Gangopadhyay and R. Lensink

Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis ; Lensink, Robert
Publisher:	Groningen
Subject:	Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Kreditrationierung \| Credit rationing \| Theorie \| Theory \| Eigentümerstruktur \| Ownership structure \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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