Costly Information Acquisition : Is It Better to Toss a Coin?

This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heteroge- neous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Triossi, Matteo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Informationskosten \| Information costs \| Informationsversorgung \| Information provision \| Informationsverhalten \| Information behaviour \| Münzen \| Coins

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222524