Costly information acquisition. Part I: better to toss a coin?

In a common-values election with two candidates voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior. They can acquire information that improves the precision of the signal. Electors differ in their information acquisition costs. For large electorates a non negligible fraction of voters acquires information, but the quantity of informed voters and the quality of acquired information decline so fast that information aggregation fails to obtain.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Triossi, Matteo
Institutions:	Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino
Subject:	Costly Information Acquisition \| Condorcet Jury Theorem

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 68 37 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405545