Costly state verification with Limited Commitment

Amirreza Ahmadzadeh

Year of publication:	September 2024
Authors:	Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza
Publisher:	[Toulouse] : [Toulouse School of Economics]
Subject:	costly state verification \| mechanism design \| cheap talk \| inspection \| limited commitment \| regulation \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory

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