Dealing with overleverage : restricting leverage vs. restricting variable compensation
Year of publication: |
March 2018
|
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Authors: | Gete, Pedro ; Gómez, Juan-Pedro |
Published in: |
The quarterly journal of finance. - Singapore : World Scientific Publ., ISSN 2010-1392, ZDB-ID 2620599-3. - Vol. 8.2018, 1, p. 1-29
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | leverage | moral hazard | overborrowing | optimism | Theorie | Theory | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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