Debt covenant design and creditor control rights : evidence from the tightest covenant
Year of publication: |
June 2017
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Authors: | Wang, Jing |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 44.2017, p. 331-352
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Subject: | Financial contracting | Incomplete contracts | Creditor rights | Asymmetric information | Agency problems | Asymmetrische Information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Gläubigerschutz | Creditor protection | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertrag | Contract | Kapitalstruktur | Capital structure | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Fremdkapital | Debt financing | Kreditsicherung | Collateral |
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