Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation
Year of publication: |
2013-08
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Yu |
Institutions: | Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research (CAEPR), Department of Economics |
Subject: | multi-agency | Bayesian implementation | mechanism design | menu design | del- egation principle |
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