Decomposing recruitment elasticity in job matching

Ryo Kambayashi, Kohei Kawaguchi, Suguru Otani

This study estimates and decomposes recruitment elasticity, a key measure of employer market power, across job-matching stages using data from Japan's largest job-matching intermediary. On average, recruitment elasticity is negative but not statistically significantly different from zero. However, this masks heterogeneity across stages. The negative elasticity arises from lower-wage workers avoiding higher-wage vacancies during inquiry. Posted wages positively influence application, interview attendance, and offer acceptance decisions, with elasticity decreasing in that order. Other important patterns are also examined.

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Year of publication:	January 2025
Authors:	Kambayashi, Ryo ; Kawaguchi, Kohei ; Otani, Suguru
Publisher:	Bonn, Germany : IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
Subject:	market power of employers \| monopsony \| job matching intermediary \| recruitment elasticity \| inquiry \| application \| interview \| offer \| control function approach \| Personalbeschaffung \| Recruitment \| Matching \| Marktmacht \| Market power \| Arbeitsuche \| Job search \| Personalauswahl \| Personnel selection \| Suchtheorie \| Search theory \| Arbeitsmarkt \| Labour market \| Arbeitsnachfrage \| Labor demand \| Monopson \| Monopsony \| Schätzung \| Estimation \| Arbeitsmarkttheorie \| Labour market theory \| Arbeitsvermittlung \| Employment office \| Elastizität \| Elasticity