Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

In a first-price all-pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non-cooperative delegation equilibrium and the delegation contracts are asymmetric, even if the buyers and the auction are perfectly symmetric.

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Year of publication:	1999-04-22
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A. ; Peters, Wolfgang ; Wärneryd, Karl
Institutions:	Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
Subject:	First-price all-pay auctions \| contests \| strategic delegation

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Series:	SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 316 12 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649176