Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 117.2012, 2, p. 405-407
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertrag | Contract |
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