Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Lindbeck, Assar ; Weibull, Jörgen W. |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 129.2020, p. 1-26
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Subject: | Investment | Bonus | Contract | Delegation | Information acquisition | Lambert W function | Penalty | Principal-agent | Principal-expert | Rational inattention | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kooperative Führung | Participative leadership |
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