Delegation of monitoring in a principal-agent relationship
Year of publication: |
1995
|
---|---|
Authors: | Strausz, Roland |
Publisher: |
Tilburg |
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Korruption | Corruption | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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