Delegation of monitoring in a principal-agent relationship

Roland Strausz

Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Strausz, Roland
Published in:	The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 64.1997, 3, p. 337-357
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Korruption \| Corruption \| Theorie \| Theory

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001239943

A service of the