Designing product development contracts in the presence of managerial lobbying
Ying Bao, Mengze Shi, Ajay Kalra
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Bao, Ying ; Shi, Mengze ; Kalra, Ajay |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 68.2022, 9, p. 6797-6818
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| Subject: | contract design | lobbying | managerial manipulation | moral hazard | project management | Projektmanagement | Project management | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Vertrag | Contract | Produktgestaltung | Product design | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Manipulation |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4217 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013373110