Deterministic Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Ex-Post Constraints

This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Jarman, Felix ; Meisner, Vincent
Publisher:	München und Berlin : Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Subject:	mechanism design \| revelation principle \| ex-post constraints

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Series:	Discussion Paper ; 32
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	895096927 [GVK] hdl:10419/185702 [Handle] RePEc:rco:dpaper:32 [RePEc]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

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