Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints
Felix Jarman, Vincent Meisner
| Year of publication: |
December 2017
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Jarman, Felix ; Meisner, Vincent |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 161.2017, p. 96-98
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| Subject: | Mechanism design | Revelation principle | Ex-post constraints | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mathematische Optimierung | Mathematical programming | Offenbarte Präferenzen | Revealed preferences | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.039 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011903993