Differential effect of inside debt, CEO compensation diversification, and firm investment
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lee, Cheng F. ; Hu, Chengru ; Foley, Maggie |
Published in: |
Handbook of investment analysis, portfolio management, and financial derivatives ; Volume 4. - New Jersey : World Scientific, ISBN 978-981-12-6325-5. - 2024, p. 3627-3680
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Inside debt | Risk-taking incentive | Systematic and idiosyncratic risk | R&D investment | Overconfidence | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Theorie | Theory | Lohn | Wages | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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