Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Christopher S. Armstrong; Rahul Vashishtha
| Year of publication: |
2012
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher ; Vashishtha, Rahul |
| Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 104.2012, 1, p. 70-88
|
| Subject: | Executive compensation | Equity incentives | Risk-taking incentives | Systematic and idiosyncratic risk | Hedging | Aktienoption | Stock option | Managervergütung | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Unternehmenswert | Firm value | Theorie | Theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Risikomanagement | Risk management | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Risiko | Risk |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009550151