DISSIPATION IN RENT-SEEKING CONTESTS WITHENTRY COSTS
Year of publication: |
2002-09-01
|
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Authors: | Cornes, Richard ; Hartley, Roger E. |
Institutions: | University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics ; University <Keele> / Department of Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Spieltheorie | game theory | Zins | Rent Seeking | rent seeking | Verschwendung | rent dissipation |
Extent: | 252928 bytes 32 p. application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISSN: | 1360-2438 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; Pay salaries and social benefits ; Ergonomic job analysis ; Market research ; Individual Working Papers, Preprints ; No country specification |
Source: | USB Cologne (business full texts) |
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