Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
Laurent Lamy, Manasa Patnam, Michael Visser
| Year of publication: |
[2019]
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Lamy, Laurent ; Patnam, Manasa ; Visser, Michael S. |
| Publisher: |
[Palaiseau] : Center for Research in Economics and Statistics |
| Subject: | Econometrics of Contracts | Econometrics of Auctions | Structural Econometrics | Endogenous Matching | Polychotomous Sample Selection | Wage-Performance Elasticity | Ökonometrie | Econometrics | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Auktion | Auction | Matching | Vertrag | Contract | Schätzung | Estimation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Ökonometrisches Modell | Econometric model |
freely available
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten) |
|---|---|
| Series: | Série des documents de travail. - [Paris], ZDB-ID 2670421-3. - Vol. no. 2019, 15 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237473