Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts

Laurent Lamy, Manasa Patnam, Michael Visser

Year of publication:	[2019]
Authors:	Lamy, Laurent ; Patnam, Manasa ; Visser, Michael S.
Publisher:	[Palaiseau] : Center for Research in Economics and Statistics
Subject:	Econometrics of Contracts \| Econometrics of Auctions \| Structural Econometrics \| Endogenous Matching \| Polychotomous Sample Selection \| Wage-Performance Elasticity \| Ökonometrie \| Econometrics \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Auktion \| Auction \| Matching \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Schätzung \| Estimation \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Ökonometrisches Modell \| Econometric model

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