Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion
Keiichi Hori, Hiroshi Osano
| Year of publication: |
2020
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Hori, Keiichi ; Osano, Hiroshi |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 111.2020, p. 1-28
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| Subject: | Continuous-time agency | Executive compensation | Managerial turnover | Mandatory deferral of incentive pay | Reference-dependent utility | Stochastic replacement | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungswechsel | Executive turnover |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103794 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012501427