Dynamic inconsistency, commitment, and welfare in strategic settings

Asen Ivanov

The choices of a dynamically inconsistent individual depend on whether she commits to consumption ahead of time or chooses consumption in the moment. In individual-choice settings, it is normatively ambiguous whether such an individual’s choices with commitment or in the moment are "better". This impasse can be overcome in settings in which dynamically inconsistent individuals interact strategically. Policy implications are discussed.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2023]
Authors:	Ivanov, Asen
Publisher:	London : School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London
Subject:	dynamic inconsistency \| commitment \| welfare \| Theorie \| Theory \| Zeitkonsistenz \| Time consistency \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis

freely available

Full text |

More access options

www.qmul.ac.uk

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	Working paper. - London : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1473-0278, ZDB-ID 2666392-2. - Vol. no. 954 (June 2023)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/284304 [Handle]
Classification:	D60 - Welfare Economics. General ; D90 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014314279