Dynamic inconsistency, commitment, and welfare in strategic settings

Asen Ivanov

The choices of a dynamically inconsistent individual depend on whether she commits to consumption ahead of time or chooses consumption in the moment. In individual-choice settings, it is normatively ambiguous whether such an individual’s choices with commitment or in the moment are "better". This impasse can be overcome in settings in which dynamically inconsistent individuals interact strategically. Policy implications are discussed.

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Year of publication:	[2023]
Authors:	Ivanov, Asen
Publisher:	London : School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London
Subject:	dynamic inconsistency \| commitment \| welfare \| Theorie \| Theory \| Zeitkonsistenz \| Time consistency \| Wohlfahrtsökonomik \| Welfare economics \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis