Dynamic managerial compensation : a variational approach

Daniel F. Garrett, Alessandro Pavan

Year of publication:	September 2015
Authors:	Garrett, Daniel F. ; Pavan, Alessandro
Published in:	Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 159.2015, p. 775-818
Subject:	Incentives \| Dynamic mechanism design \| Adverse selection \| Moral hazard \| Persistent productivity shocks \| Risk aversion \| Adverse Selektion \| Moral Hazard \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Risikoaversion \| Produktivität \| Productivity \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Schock \| Shock \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation

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