Dynamic unstructured bargaining with private information : theory, experiment, and outcome prediction via machine learning
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Camerer, Colin ; Nave, Gideon ; Smith, Alec |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 65.2019, 4, p. 1867-1890
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Subject: | bargaining | dynamic games | private information | mechanism design | machine learning | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Künstliche Intelligenz | Artificial intelligence | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Lernprozess | Learning process | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Experiment |
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