Dynamically consistent voting rules

Madhav Chandrasekher (Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, United States)

Year of publication:	December 2015
Authors:	Chandrasekher, Madhav
Published in:	Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 160.2015, p. 175-187
Subject:	Aggregation of preferences \| Dynamic consistency \| Strategy-proofness \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Aggregation

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