Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on CEOs' stock ownership and pay-performance sensitivity
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chang, Hsihui ; Choy, Hiu Lam ; Wan, Kam-ming |
Published in: |
Review of quantitative finance and accounting. - New York, NY : Springer, ISSN 0924-865X, ZDB-ID 1087855-5. - Vol. 38.2012, 2, p. 177-207
|
Subject: | SOX | CEO | Stock ownership | Pay-performance sensitivity | Führungskräfte | Managers | Internes Kontrollsystem | Internal control | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Börsenkurs | Share price | Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung | Employee ownership | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
-
Kanyarat Lek Sanoran, (2022)
-
Does non-controlling large shareholder monitoring improve CEO incentives?
Hui, Zhiyang, (2022)
-
Do compensation committees pay attention to Section 404 opinions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?
Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin, (2012)
- More ...
-
Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on CEOs' Stock Ownership and Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Chang, Hsihui, (2011)
-
Effect of the Sarbanes–Oxley act on CEOs’ stock ownership and pay-performance sensitivity
Chang, Hsihui, (2012)
-
Chang, Hsihui, (2009)
- More ...