Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets

This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Kind, Hans Jarle ; Koethenbuerger, Marko ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Optimale Besteuerung \| Subvention \| Monopol \| Wirtschaftliche Effizienz \| Wohlfahrtseffekt \| Theorie

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 2262
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	560540051 [GVK] hdl:10419/26307 [Handle]
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H22 - Incidence ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264333