Efficient Networks for a Class of Games with Global Spillovers

In this paper we examine efficient networks in network formation games with global spillovers that satisfy convexity and sub-modularity properties. Unlike the previous literature we impose these properties on individual payoff functions. We establish that efficient networks of this class of games are nested split graphs. This allows us to complete the work of Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Westbrock (2010) on collaborative oligopoly networks

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Billand, Pascal
Other Persons:	Bravard, Christophe (contributor) ; Durieu, Jacques (contributor) ; Sarangi, Sudipta (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spillover-Effekt \| Spillover effect \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Netzwerk \| Network \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009710