Efficient outcomes in repeated games with limited monitoring
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schaar, Mihaela van der ; Xiao, Yuanzhang ; Zame, William R. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 60.2015, 1, p. 1-34
|
Subject: | Repeated games | Imperfect public monitoring | Perfect public equilibrium | Efficient outcomes | Repeated resource allocation | Repeated partnership | Repeated contest | Wiederholte Spiele | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Allokation | Allocation |
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