Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hendricks, Kenneth ; Pinkse, Joris ; Porter, Robert H. |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass. : NBER |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Theorie | Theory | Auktion | Auction | Erdölvorkommen | Petroleum resources | Schätzung | Estimation | USA | United States | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Erdölbohrung | 1954-1970 |
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