Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first-price, symmetric, common value auctions
Year of publication: |
Aug. 1999 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
|
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Other Persons: | Hendricks, Kenneth (contributor) ; Pinkse, Joris (contributor) ; Porter, Robert H. (contributor) |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Industrial Organisation (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Evanston, Ill. : Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ. |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Theorie | Theory | Auktion | Auction | Erdölvorkommen | Petroleum resources | Schätzung | Estimation | USA | United States | 1954-1970 |
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