Entry and quality signaling when the incumbent is informed of the entrant's quality
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Fulan, Wu |
Published in: |
The Singapore economic review : journal of the Economic Society of Singapore and the Department of Economics, National University of Singapore. - Hackensack, NJ [u.a.] : World Scientific, ISSN 0217-5908, ZDB-ID 231534-8. - Vol. 59.2014, 5, p. 1-16
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Subject: | Quality signaling | entry deterrence | unprejudiced beliefs | Markteintritt | Market entry | Signalling | Produktqualität | Product quality | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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