Epistemic robustness of sets closed under rational behavior

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-03-30
Authors:	Asheim, Geir ; Voorneveld, Mark ; Weibull, Jörgen W.
Institutions:	Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
Subject:	epistemic game theory \| epistemic robustness \| rationalizability \| closedness under rational behavior \| mutual p-belief

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 714 16 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649229