Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Jaramillo, Paula ; Kayı, Çaǧatay ; Klijn, Flip
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 82.2013, C, p. 693-701
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Many-to-one matching \| Deferred acceptance \| Nash equilibrium \| Dropping strategies \| Filled positions \| Welfare

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D60 - Welfare Economics. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049696