Equivalence between best responses and undominated strategies: a generalization from finite to compact strategy sets.

For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce''s (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.

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Year of publication:	2005-02-19
Authors:	Zimper, Alexander
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2005, 7, p. 1-6
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836092