Error Noted in “Robust Contract Designs : Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard” by Yu and Kong (2020)

One of the main results of “Robust Contract Designs: Linear Contracts and Moral Hazard” by Yu and Kong (2020) is Proposition 4, which states that the optimal robust contract with a piecewise linear concave agent utility only consists of progressive fixed payments and linear rewards with progressive commission rates. In this note, we construct a counterexample showing that this result is wrong

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Yang, Jingyuan ; Xin, Linwei
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 29, 2021 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3895883 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217427