Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes

This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove that there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Hirai, Shumei
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 32.2012, 4, p. 2744-2751
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Contests \| Endogenous prize \| Existence and uniqueness

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011278614