Fair by design : multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mu̕alem, Ahuva |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 88.2014, p. 29-46
|
Subject: | Envy-free allocations | Optimization | Profit maximization | Mechanism design | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Allokation | Allocation | Gerechtigkeit | Justice | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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