Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games

An equilibrium in an infinite horizon game is called a finite state equilibrium, if each player's action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a finite state space. We provide a complete characterization of this class of equilibria and provide a recursive computational method to check the equilibrium conditions. This encompasses the majority of existing works on repeated games with private monitoring.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Kandori, Michihiro ; Obara, Ichiro
Institutions:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	2007 Meeting Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series 2007 SED Meeting Papers Number 253
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082080