Fiscal bargaining and the implicit fiscal constitutions of liberal democracies : a public choice perspective
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Congleton, Roger D. |
Published in: |
Public policy review. - Tokyo, ISSN 1880-0955, ZDB-ID 2192826-5. - Vol. 15.2019, 2, p. 175-197
|
Subject: | Public Choice | Fiscal Constitutions | Delegation | Rational Ignorance | Public Finance in Democracies | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory | Finanzverfassung | Fiscal constitution | Demokratie | Democracy | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics | Öffentliche Finanzen | Public finance | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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