From incentives to control to adaptation : exploring interactions between formal and relational governance
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Baker, George P. ; Gibbons, Robert ; Murphy, Kevin James |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 179.2023, 3/4, p. 500-529
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Subject: | relational contracts | formal governance structure | incentives | control,adaptation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract |
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