Government incentive contract design for carbon reduction innovation considering market value under asymmetric information
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cai, Dong ; Zhang, Guoxing ; Lai, Kee-hung ; Guo, Chunxiang ; Su, Bin |
Published in: |
Energy policy : the international journal of the political, economic, planning, environmental and social aspects of energy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, ISSN 1873-6777, ZDB-ID 2000898-3. - Vol. 186.2024, Art.-No. 114009, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Carbon reduction innovation | Asymmetric information | Market value | Government monitoring | Optimal incentive contract design | Asymmetrische Information | Treibhausgas-Emissionen | Greenhouse gas emissions | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Innovation | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Emissionshandel | Emissions trading | Marktwert |
-
Contract and incentive mechanism in low-carbon R&D cooperation
Liu, Kening, (2017)
-
Wang, Yangyang, (2024)
-
The additionality problem with offsets: Optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests
Mason, Charles F., (2013)
- More ...
-
Cai, Dong, (2024)
-
Tan, Yuyang, (2023)
-
Nie, Yan, (2024)
- More ...