Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.

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Year of publication:	2005-11-24
Authors:	Null, Abraham Neyman ; Okada, Daijiro
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick
Subject:	bounded rationality \| strategy set growth \| strategic complexity \| nonstationary bounded recall \| repeated games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Departmental Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626671