Hiring costs, open source signaling, and buyer power
Year of publication: |
2009 ; 1., Auflage
|
---|---|
Authors: | Blatter, Marc |
Publisher: |
Berlin : dissertation.de |
Subject: | Arbeitsnachfrage | Labor demand | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment | Kosten | Costs | Betriebliche Ausbildung | Apprenticeship training | Arbeitsmarkt | Labour market | Monopson | Monopsony | Theorie | Theory | Schweiz | Switzerland | Open Source | Open source | Signalling | Personalmarketing | HR marketing | Arbeitskräfte | Workforce | Lieferantenbewertung | Supplier evaluation | Nachfragemacht | Buyer power | Einzelhandel | Retail trade | Duopol | Duopoly | Einarbeitung | Signaling |
Description of contents: | Table of Contents [d-nb.info] ; Description [deposit.dnb.de] |
-
Lewerth, Tobias, (2014)
-
Lewerth, Tobias, (2014)
-
Too good to hire? : capability and inferences about commitment in labor markets
Galperin, Roman V., (2020)
- More ...
-
Blatter, Marc, (2008)
-
Exclusivity clauses: Enhancing competition, raising prices
Blatter, Marc, (2013)
-
Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc, (2014)
- More ...