How long is a long-term-firm investment in the presence of governance mechanisms?
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Mavruk, Taylan ; Carlsson, Evert |
Published in: |
Eurasian business review. - Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, ISSN 2147-4281, ZDB-ID 2646820-7. - Vol. 5.2015, 1, p. 117-149
|
Subject: | Managerial myopia | Ownership concentration | Gini coefficient | Short-term incentive plan | Market for corporate control | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Übernahme | Takeover | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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